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Abstract
We propose informational spillovers as a new rationale for the use of multiple
policy instruments to mitigate a single externality. We investigate the design of a
pollution standard when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown and emissions
are taxed. A firm might abate pollution beyond what is required by the standard
by equalizing its marginal abatement costs to the tax rate, thereby revealing
information about its abatement cost. We analyze how a regulator can take
advantage of this information to design the standard. In a dynamic setting,
the regulator relaxes the initial standard in order to induce more information
revelation, which would allow her to set a standard closer to the first best in
the future. Updating standards, though, generates a ratchet effect since a low-
cost firm might strategically hide its cost by abating no more than required by
the standard. We characterize the optimal standard and its update across time
depending on the firm’s abatement strategy. We illustrate our theoretical results
with the case of NOx regulation in Sweden. We find evidence that the firms that
pay the NOx tax experience more frequent standard updates and more stringent
revisions than those who are exempted.
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l’Université, 31000 Toulouse, France. Email: stefan.ambec@tse-fr.eu. Phone: +33 5 61 12 85 16.
Fax: +33 5 61 12 85 20.
‡University of Gothenburg. Email: Jessica.Coria@economics.gu.se.
1
1 Introduction
The laws pertaining to many major environmental problems, as for instance, clean air,
clean water and management of hazardous waste - are typically enacted and managed
at all levels of government, implying that many regulations overlap and override each
other. This is, for instance, the case of climate policy, where all countries and regions
that have implemented climate policies seem to rely on several policy instruments
(covering the same emission sources) rather than a single one (see e.g., Fankhauser et
al. 2010, Levinson 2011 and Novan 2017).
The multiplicity of policy instruments to address a single pollution problem has
been justified on several grounds. For instance, some (additional) market failures,
regulatory failures or behavioral failures may reduce the economic efficiency of market-
based instruments and justify additional policy instruments (see e.g., Bennear and
Stavins 2007, Lehmann 2012, Lecuyer and Quirion 2013, Coria et al. 2021). The aim
of this paper is not to discuss these justifications, but to introduce and discuss another
rationale: the informational value of the policy overlap. We highlight the informational
value of a pollution tax in the design of other environmental regulations when a firm’s
costs of abating pollution are unknown. We investigate whether and how a tax can
help regulators set and update a standard (a cap) on pollutant emissions. Our idea is
that the tax rate reveals information about the marginal cost of compliance that can
be used to better target the standard to the firm’s true cost.
The empirical motivation behind our paper is the overlap between market-based
and command and control regulations that occurs in many places around the world.
The economic literature traditionally argues for the superiority of market-based regula-
tions over command-and-control, primarily because of the relative cost savings expected
with market-based approaches. Even if market-based regulations such as environment
taxes and emission trading schemes, are increasingly being used to implement environ-
mental policy, command and control are still the most prevailing regulations in place.1
Examples of the overlap between market-based and command and control regulations
abound. In China, a large number of technological measures to save energy and improve
air quality have been adopted in addition to the implementation of emissions trading
schemes on carbon dioxide (see e,g., Stavins and Stowe 2020). Moreover, European
1For instance, Schmitt and Schulze (2011) document that between 1970 and 2011 command and
control were the most prevalent air-pollution control instruments in the European Union. In China
and India, most of the environmental legislation also takes the form of command and control (see
Greenstone and Hanna 2014).
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countries are increasingly using taxes to reduce carbon emissions and pesticide use,
which overlap with technical requirements and the issuance of limit values on polluting
inputs or emissions.
We develop a theoretical analysis of the design of an emission standard by a welfare-
maximizing regulator under asymmetric information about abatement costs, with a
tax on emissions set exogenously (i.e. out of the control of the regulator). Using such
framework, we investigate how taxing emissions modifies emission standards. Does
taxing polluters result in more or less stringent standards? How does the standard
evolve over time with and without tax? Our model characterizes the value of the
informational spillover that the tax induces on the design of the standard over time.
We then move to an empirical analysis for the case of Sweden, where NOx emissions
by stationary pollution sources are regulated through a combination of a nationally
determined emission tax and locally negotiated emission standards. We investigate the
extent to which the informational spillover generated by the tax has been used in the
design of NOx standards.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the informational
value of an economic instrument (a tax) for the design of a command-and-control in-
strument (a standard). Previous studies have analyzed the effectiveness of multiple
instruments when there is uncertainty about abatement costs. Building on Weitzman
(1974), Roberts and Spence (1976) show, for instance, that a mixed system, involving
taxes and quantity regulations (in the form of marketable tradable permits) is prefer-
able to either instrument used separately because such a mix better approximates the
shape of the pollution damage function. A similar argument is developed by Mandell
(2008) and Caillaud and Demange (2017), who show that, under some conditions, it
is more efficient to regulate a part of emissions by a cap-and-trade program and the
rest by an emission tax, rather than using a single instrument. Another strand of the
literature has taken a mechanism design approach to analyze environmental regulation
when abatement costs are unknown by the regulator, e.g., Kwerel (1977), Dasgupta et
al. (1980), Spulber (1988), Lewis (1996), Duggan and Roberts (2002). Those studies
rely on the direct revelation mechanism to identify a regulation that induces truthful
revelation of abatement costs. They end up recommending complex instruments, such
as non-linear pollution taxes. Our approach is different in the sense that we do not
look at the design of an individual instrument to induce information revelation. We
indeed take it as given: the environmental tax is exogenous to the regulator. The
question is rather how the regulator can take advantage of the information revealed by
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the tax to set correctly another instrument which does not reveal information. We thus
show that regulators can make use of the informational properties of a market-based
instrument to improve the design of a command-and-control instrument. It is so even
if the market-based instrument is exogenous for the regulator because it is controlled
by another administration, potentially at higher level, e.g. national or federal.2
The methodology we use has been developed in mechanism design and contract
theory with the so-called Principal-agent model. A Principal (here the regulator)
interacts with an agent (here the firm) under asymmetric information about one of
the agent’s characteristics (here its abatement cost) called its ’type’. Under adverse
selection (as in our paper), types are exogenous to the agent. The agent undertakes
an action (here how much pollution to emit) that reveals information about its type.
The Principal designs a mechanism that induces the agent to reveal its type. The
equilibrium is then called separating because it separate types. Otherwise it is pooling.3
The Principal-agent framework under adverse selection leads to the well-known
ratchet effect when it is repeated. The ratchet effect arises when the agent correctly
anticipates that the future regulation will be updated to be more stringent if it reveals
that its type is low-cost. The agent prefers to hide its cost by ’mimicking’ a high-cost
type. In our framework, it means that the firm prefers not to over-comply with the
standard despite its short-term interest in doing so. Thus, the firm hides its type to
have a less stringent standard in the future.
The ratchet effect has been studied in contract theory but seldom investigated in
the context of environmental policies. Previous theoretical analysis has shown that
the ratchet effect precludes information revelation, often leading to pooling and semi-
pooling equilibria (Freixas et al., 1985, Laffont and Tirole, 1988). For instance, Laffont
and Tirole (1988) deals with a procurement model under asymmetric information on
production costs with a continuum of types and two periods. If the contract lasts only
one period, the optimal contract reveals all types. However, this is not anymore true
when the relationship is repeated. The authors show that some pooling is necessary in
the first period due to the ratchet effect.
Our framework differs from mechanism design and contract theory in several dimen-
2This assumption is consistent with current practices. See e.g., Segerson (2020), who discusses how
market-based regulations such as environmental taxes and emission trading schemes are increasingly
being used by national/subnational regulators around the world to implement environmental policy,
while local regulators typically use command and control regulations.
3We use the terminology of separating or pooling the types of a single agent (firm) following
Fundenberg and Tirole (1991) pages 326-327. It is also used by Gerardi and Maestri (2020) who
analyze a game with a single firm (the principal) and a single worker (the agent).
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sion, notably on the mechanism itself which is not a payment contingent on the agent’s
decision but rather a limit on the decision itself, i.e. a cap on pollution. Moreover, the
revelation of types is not induced by the mechanism but rather by a tax on pollution
which is out of the Principal’s control. It turns out that some pooling occurs even if
the relationship lasts only one period. With multiple periods, the Principal relaxes the
standard to reveal (separate) more types when the relationship becomes dynamic. We
identify how much information is revealed with and without the ratchet effect.
The mechanism design literature has been applied to the regulation of natural
monopolies and network industries when production costs are firm’s private information
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Such studies analyze specific instruments such as rate-of-
return or price-cap, while in contrast we look at a cap of polluting emissions.4
Similar dynamic contracting under adverse selection arises in the seller-buyer rela-
tionships (Hart and Tirole, 1988, Skreta, 2006) or in labor contracts (Kanemoto and
MacLeod, 1992). In the former literature, Strulovici (2017) shows that, with an infi-
nite horizon as assumed here, all equilibria converge to a fully separation of types. In
contrast, in our paper, some pooling of types remains over time and no more revelation
of types occurs after the second period.
In the most recent literature, the paper closest to ours is Gerardi and Maestri
(2020), who study the relationship between a worker (privately informed about his
productivity) and a firm that can only commit to short-term contracts. In line with
our results, they show that the labor contracts can entail full revelation of types in
the first period if the discount factor is high enough. Otherwise, the equilibrium is
close to a pooling allocation where the firm offers the most profitable contract that the
high-cost worker is willing to accept.
In contrast to Gerardi and Maestri (2020), who investigate the case of two cost-
types, in our framework, there is a continuum of types, and some of them are pooled.
More precisely, the standard determines a threshold type such that all types below this
threshold are revealed while those above are pooled. We show that learning occurs
only during the first period, i.e., no more types are revealed among those types that
are pooled after the first period. We also show that the ratchet effect reduces this
threshold type, meaning that fewer types are revealed and more are pooled when the
firm is forward-looking by anticipating correctly the update of the standard.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model.
4In the conclusion section, we discuss how our analysis can be useful for the regulation of quality
in natural monopolies like in Baron (1985).
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We analyze the design of an optimal emission standard by considering successively a
myopic firm in Section 3 and a forward-looking firm in Section 4. We characterize the
optimal standard and its update over time depending on how the firm responds to
both the standard and the tax. Section 5 investigates to what extend our theoretical
predictions on the optimal design of the standard are in line with what we observe on
NOx regulation in Sweden. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 A model of pollution control
Let us consider a public authority called ‘the regulator’ (hereinafter referred as ‘she’)
regulating the polluting emissions released by a firm through an emission standard.
The regulator is a welfare-maximizer: she cares about environmental damage and the
cost of controlling pollution. Uncontrolled emissions denoted e0 can be abated by the
firm at some cost which is unknown by the regulator. Let q denote pollution abatement.
The benefit from reducing pollution by q units is B(q) while the cost is θC(q). The
parameter θ captures the level of abatement costs. It is called the firm’s type and it is
exogenously given.5 It belongs to the range [θ, θ̄] with ∆θ = θ̄ − θ > 0. The density
and cumulative distribution of the a priori beliefs on the distribution of θ over the
range [θ, θ̄] are denoted f and F respectively. The benefit function B(q) is increasing
and (weakly) concave, reflecting decreasing (or constant) marginal benefit from abating
pollution. Similarly, the cost function C(q) is increasing and convex, thereby implying
an increasing marginal cost of abatement.
The welfare from having a firm of type θ abating q units of polluting emissions is:
W (q, θ) ≡ B(q)− θC(q). (1)
The first-best abatement level q∗(θ) maximizes W (q, θ) with respect to q. It is defined
by the following first-order condition:
B′(q∗(θ)) = θC ′(q∗(θ)), (2)
for every θ ∈ [θ, θ̄], where q∗(θ) ≤ e0.
5The model can easily be extended to endogenize θ via the investment in new technologies at
expenses of a fixed cost. The same argument would hold as long as the investment is profitable for
the firm. If not, the standard might be strengthened further to induce this investment.
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An emission standard defines a minimal abatement effort denoted s.6 Assume, for
now, that pollution is regulated solely through the standard. Under uncertainty about
θ, the regulator imposes a standard that maximizes the expected welfare given her
beliefs about the firm’s type. Let θ̂ ≡ Eθ[θ] be the firm’s expected type given the
regulator’s beliefs. The abatement standard without tax q̂∗ maximizes the expected
welfare
Eθ[W (q, θ)] = W (q, θ̂) = B(q)− θ̂C(q),
with respect to q. The first-order condition that defines q∗(θ̂) equalizes the marginal
benefit from abatement to the expected marginal cost:
B′(q∗(θ̂)) = θ̂C ′(q∗(θ̂)). (3)
As we will explained later on, the standard s = q∗(θ̂) is called pooling.
Consider now a tax per unit of pollution denoted τ . It makes abatement profitable
for the firm even in the absence of an emission standard because the firm saves τ each
time it reduces emissions by one unit. Therefore, in absence of a standard, the firm
chooses the abatement level that minimizes its cost net of the tax bill saved, formally
θC(q) − τq.7 Let us denote as qτ (θ) the abatement effort carried out by the firm of
type θ. It is defined by the first-order condition that equalizes the marginal abatement
cost to the tax rate:
θC ′(qτ (θ)) = τ. (4)





for every θ. It is increasing with the tax rate τ and
decreasing with the type θ. We assume that the tax does not fully reflect the marginal
benefit of abatement. This is to say, the abatement level induced by the tax is sub-
optimal regardless of the type: qτ (θ) < q∗(θ) for every θ.8
The regulation game is the non-cooperative game aiming at modeling the relation-
6Given uncontrolled emissions e0 and pollution abatement q, the emissions released to the envi-
ronment are given by e0 − q. Such emissions should not exceed an emission standard denoted by ē.
Thus, e0 − q ≤ ē, or equivalently, q ≥ ē − e0. Thus, we can say that an emission standard defines a
minimal abatement effort that we denote by s ≡ ē− e0.
7Note that it is equivalent to minimizing costs including the fiscal cost θC(q) + τ [e0 − q], where
the fixed term τe0 will not affect first order conditions.
8This assumption implies that standards are set for all of the firm’s types. It avoids considering the
case of over-abatement with tax compared to the optimal level. This can easily be justified empirically
since most environmental taxes are set below the Pigouvian rate.
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ship between the regulator setting the standard and the firm. The tax τ and the firm’s
type θ are exogenous to both players. They are determined before the regulator chooses
the standard. The tax is common knowledge while the type is firm’s private informa-
tion. After the type θ has been privately observed by the firm, the regulator and the
firm interact into an infinity of stage games. During each of them, the regulator sets
a standard and the firm chooses how much pollution to abate. The sequence of moves
is as follow:
0 The firm observes its type θ and the tax rate τ is common-knowledge.
t Stage game in period t ≥ 1:
t.1 The regulator chooses the standard st.
t.2 The firm chooses its abatement strategy qt ≥ st.
t.3 The welfare and costs are realized.
The firm’s type does not change over time.9 Both players discount payoffs (welfare
and costs) with the same factor β > 0. We first analyze the design of the standard
in a static framework where the game lasts only one period as a benchmark before
investigating equilibrium solutions of the regulation game.
2.2 The static standard
Suppose the regulation game is played only in period 1. Given the standard s, the
firm chooses its abatement effort that minimizes its cost subject to complying with the
standard. The firm of type θ chooses q that minimizes θC(q) − τq subject to q ≥ s.
If the constraint is not binding, the tax rate drives the firm’s abatement effort and
the firm equalizes marginal abatement cost to the tax rate by choosing the abatement
level qτ (θ), defined in (4). Otherwise, the firm’s abatement effort matches the standard
s. Thus, firm θ’s best reply to the standard s defines an incentive-compatibility (IC)
constraint:
q(θ) = max{s, qτ (θ)}. (5)
The regulator chooses the standard s that maximizes the expected welfare E[W (q(θ), θ)] =
E[B(q(θ)) − θC(q(θ))] subject to the firm’s IC constraint (5). For low tax rates, the
9We discuss how relaxing this assumption by assuming that θ changes overtime changes our result
at the end of Section 3.
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abatement level induced by the tax qτ (θ) is so low that the IC constraint simplifies to
q(θ) = s for every θ. The standard is set at s = q∗(θ̂). The firm reduces pollution to
meet the standard but not more regardless of its type. The solution is pooling in the
sense that the firm’s abatement effort does not reveal information about its type.
For higher tax rates, the IC constraint defines a threshold θ̃ such that q(θ) = qτ (θ)
if θ ≤ θ̃ and q(θ) = s if θ ≥ θ̃. This is to say, if the firm’s type θ is below the threshold,
the firm abates a level determined by the tax while it abates what is required by the
standard if its type is above the threshold. The threshold is defined by qτ (θ̃) = s or,
equivalently, by θ̃ = τ
C ′(s)





W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ) +
# θ̄
θ̃
W (s, θ)dF (θ) subject to qτ (θ̃) = s.
Let us denote the standard that solves this problem as ss (with an upper-script ‘s’ for
static). The first-order condition yields:




Using f(θ|θ ≥ θ̃) = f(θ)
1− F (θ̃)
leads to
B′(ss) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ̃]C ′(ss), (6)
The standard is chosen such that the marginal benefit of abatement equals the marginal
cost in expectation for all types for which the standard is binding, i.e, with a θ higher
than θ̃.10
3 Information revelation with a myopic firm
3.1 Regulation update
We assume that the firm is myopic or short-term in its thinking, as it considers only
the current abatement costs when picking its abatement strategy. This assumption
is relaxed in the next section. We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). We construct a PBE in which the regulator updates the standard based on the
10Note that our assumption q∗(θ) > qτ (θ) implies that the standard is binding for some types.
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firm’s past abatement strategy. The equilibrium strategies are formally described in
Appendix A.1. Let us consider the first standard update in period 2. Given the first-
period standard s1, after having observed the firm’s abatement strategy in period 1, the
regulator designs a new standard s2. The regulator takes advantage of the information
revealed by the firm’s abatement decision during the first period to update its beliefs on
the firm’s type. Given the information obtained, she tailors the standard closer to the
firm’s expected type. If the firm over-complies by abating qτ (θ) > s1, the regulator can
perfectly infer that its type is θ. She updates the standard to the first-best abatement
level s2 = q
∗(θ). We say that the regulator has revealed the firm’s type θ (its private
information) with the standard s1. All types below a threshold type denoted θ̃1 are
revealed. The threshold type is such that the firm’s abatement induced by the tax





A firm with type θ < θ̃1 over-complies and, therefore, experiences a standard update
s2 = q
∗(θ). Hence the standard reveals all information about types in the range [θ, θ̃1].
Note that an increase of the threshold type θ̃1 would lead to revelation of more types
as the range [θ, θ̃1] expands.
If the firm abates the level required by the standard s1, some uncertainty about
its type remains. Nevertheless the information on the firm’s type becomes more pre-
cise because types lower than θ̃1 can be excluded. The firm’s type should therefore
belong to the range [θ̃1, θ̄]. It is distributed according to the conditional cumulative
F (θ|θ ≥ θ̃1). In the beginning of period 2, the regulator and the firm are thus starting
a regulation game with the updated distribution of types. This sequence of regulation
update is represented in Figure 1 below.
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st = q
∗(θ) for t = 2, ...
Regulation game
with θ ∈ [θ, θ]
F (θ) Regulation game
with θ ∈ [θ̃1, θ]




Figure 1: Regulation update
If in period 2 the regulator would want to reveal some types in the range [θ̃1, θ̄].
Hence, she should relax the standard so that firm over-complies with the standard
if its type is within this range. The second period standard s2 should then be such
that s2 < s1 to obtain a threshold θ̃2 > θ̃1 so that all types in the range [θ̃1, θ̃2] are
revealed. As shown in Appendix A.2., this is not optimal. This allows us to establish
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 θ̃2 = θ̃1 such that no more information is revealed after period 1.
The proof is by contradiction. We show that, if the standard is relaxed to s2 < s1, the
expected discounted welfare in period 1 would have been higher with s2 instead of s1,
which contradicts that s1 would have been optimal. Hence, starting from date t = 2,
the standard st pools at types in the range [θ̃1, θ̄] by setting st = s2 > s1 for every
t > 1. Thus, if the firm’s type in the range [θ̃1, θ̄], the IC constraint (5) bowls down to
qt = st. The updated standard s2 maximizes the expected welfare given the updated
beliefs:
E[W (s2, θ)|θ ≥ θ̃1] (8)
The first-order condition that defines the solution sd2 to (8) is:
B′(sd2) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ̃1]C ′(sd2). (9)
It is similar to the one of the standard without tax in (3) with the expected type
E[θ|θ ≥ θ̃1].
Lemma 1 indicates that the tax is used to reveal types only during the first period.
In that period, types in the range [θ, θ̃1] are revealed. No more types are revealed after
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period 1. Hence, the tax does not impact the abatement strategy of the firm if its type
belong to the range [θ̃1, θ̄]. We now move to the choice of the first period’s standard
s1.
11
3.2 First period’s standard
In the first period, the regulator chooses the standard s1 that maximizes the discounted
expected welfare given that the standard will be updated to s2 = q
∗(θ) if the firm abates
qτ (θ) > s1 and to the standard s2 = s
d
2 if the firm abates s1. As shown by Lemma 1,
the standard remains unchanged after period 2. Hence the per-period expected welfare
is W (q∗(θ), θ) if abatement is qτ (θ) > s1 and E[W (s
d
2, θ)|θ ≥ θ̃1] if abatement is s1.





1− β the current value of a constant future flow of
welfare. The regulator thus maximizes:
# θ̃1
θ
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ)+
# θ̄
θ̃1
W (s1, θ)dF (θ)+ρ
%# θ̃1
θ
W (q∗(θ), θ)dF (θ) + V (sd2, θ̃1)
&
(10)
where θ̃1 is defined in (7) with θ < θ̃1 < θ̄. The last term in the brackets in (10) is the
per-period welfare in expectation from period 2 onward. It includes two terms: (i) the
first-best welfare W (q∗(θ), θ) when the firm is of type θ ≤ θ̃1 and it reveals its type by
over-complying, and (ii) the maximal value of the expected welfare with the revised
standard s2 given the updated beliefs that the firm’s type is θ ≥ θ̃1.
The solution to the problem in equation (10) is denoted sd1 and satisfies the following
first-order condition:
B′(sd1) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ̃1]C ′(sd1)− ρ
'
W (q∗(θ̃1), θ̃1)−W (sd2, θ̃1)
(
) *+ ,










< 0 is found by differentiating (7) and q2(θ̃1) is the firm θ̃1’s
abatement level during the second period. The standard sd1 is such that the marginal
benefit of a more stringent standard on the left-hand side of (11) equals the marginal
cost on the right-hand side. Likewise for the first-order condition of the static prob-
11If we restrict our case to two types of cost, as in Gerardi and Maestri (2020), the standard entails
full revelation of types in the first period when the tax is high enough. The analysis of the two types
case is available on request.
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lem in (6), the marginal cost is computed in expectation over all types for which the
standard is binding, i.e., all θ higher than θ̃1. What is new compared to (6) is the
second term on the right-hand side that accounts for the marginal value of the in-
formation revealed by the tax. This value is the marginal loss of welfare from not
revealing types with a more stringent standard. It is decomposed into three terms.
First, dθ̃1
ds1
< 0 captures the fact that increasing s1 decreases the threshold type θ̃1,









is the welfare gain of revealing the marginal type θ1
(or the welfare loss of not revealing it). Indeed, if θ̃1 had been revealed, the standard
could be set at the efficient level q∗(θ̃1) for the rest of the game, thereby achieving









each period (where sd2 is defined by (9)). Third, this loss is weighted by
the regulator’s updated beliefs about the share of threshold types f(θ̃1|θ ≥ θ̃1) and
discounted with ρ =
β
1− β .
Since the welfare gain from revealing θ̃1 in (11) is strictly positive, the right-hand
side of (11) is higher than the right-hand side of (6) for a given standard.12 Since the
left-hand side of both conditions (6) and (11) are the same function of the standard, we
have sd1 < s
s. This is to say, the standard is relaxed to acquire information that is used
the next period. Thus, in a dynamic setting in which a firm is regulated by a standard
and a tax, the tax is used to reveal information about the marginal cost of abatement
that can be used when revising the standard. The way in which the regulator can
modify the first-period standard to increase information revelation is summarized in
the proposition below.
Proposition 1 The first-period standard is lower than in the static game to induce
more revelation of types, i.e., sd1 < s
s. It is then strengthened to the first-best abatement
level if the firm reveals its type by over-complying, i.e., if q1(θ) = q
τ (θ) > sd1 then s2 =
q∗(θ) > sd1. It is also strengthened if the firm does not over-comply with the standard








Proposition 1 explains how the regulator takes advantage of the tax to better design
the standard. Compared to the case without tax or with only one period, the standard
is less stringent in the first period to induce more information revelation in the sense
12Consistently, the first-order (11) boils down to the one of the static model (6) when β = 0.
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that more types are revealed through over-compliance. In the second period, the
standard is strengthened regardless the firm’s abatement strategy. It is set at the first-
best abatement level if the firm reveals its type by over-complying. If not, it is also
strengthened because the tax is not used anymore to reveal types.
Before moving to the analysis of a strategic firm, we briefly discuss how our results
would change if the firm’s type changes over time. Although this extension would
require a full analysis, we outline how having a new draw of type θ at the beginning of
period 2 would modify the design of the standard in period 1 and its update in period
2. By assuming perfect correlation of type across the two periods, we assign a maximal
value to the information revealed by the environmental tax about the abatement costs
in the second period. Full information is revealed if the firm over-complies during the
first period, which leads the regulator to implement the first-best. Furthermore, the
regulator can exclude a full range of potential types if the firm does not over-comply.
In reality, a firm’s abatement costs evolve over time due to technological progress and
the business environment, which means in our model that the first-period cost type
is only partly correlated to the second-period one. Nevertheless, as long as the types
are correlated over time, the information revealed in the first period has some value in
the second period. Even though the first-best might not be achieved if the firm over-
complies, welfare is improved as long as the information about the first-period type
allows the regulator to reduce the variance of her beliefs about the second-period type.
The standard is probably strengthened but not as much as it would be with perfect
correlation. Similarly, when the firm’s abatement does not exceed the standard, the
full range of potential types excluded in the first period cannot be excluded in the
second period. Yet the regulator has more precise information about the firm’s type
in the second period than she had initially in the first period, which allows her to
modify the standard in the second period. Hence, the informational spillovers between
policy instruments would remain even under imperfect but positive correlation among
the firm’s abatement costs across time. However, in contrast to the case of perfect
correlation, the standard might change after period 2 to induce the revelation of new
types.
4 Information revelation with a forward-looking firm
Let us assume now that the firm is forward-looking and strategic. It takes into account
the impact of its abatement strategy in the first period on the second period standard.
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The revision of the standard leads to the well-known ratchet effect in mechanism design:
the firm behaves strategically to avoid more demanding regulations in the future.13
In our framework, the firm might not pick its per-period cost-minimizing abatement
strategy qτ (θ) if its type is θ < θ̃1 to avoid a more stringent standard in the future.
Doing so, the firm does not reveal its type θ. It is at a cost now but the future
reward might offset this cost. We investigate to what extend the regulator can still
take advantage of the tax to reveal types and update the standard accordingly.
Two behaviors might prevent the revelation of the firm’s type. First, the firm
might hide its cost by abating at the level of the standard s1 instead of its cost-
minimizing abatement level qτ (θ) > s1. Doing so, the firm increases its cost in the
first period. However, this extra cost can be more than offset by the future gain from
a lower standard updating, as the firm will then be required to abate s2 instead of
q∗(θ). Second, the firm θ might mimic a higher-cost type θ′ such that θ̃1 > θ
′ > θ by
picking the abatement strategy qτ (θ′) > s1 to avoid a more stringent standard update
in the future, i.e. s2 = q
∗(θ′) instead of s2 = q
∗(θ) with q∗(θ′) < q∗(θ). We examine
these two opportunistic behaviors separately.14 They define two dynamic incentive-
compatibility (DIC) constraints ensuring truthful revelation of types with a strategic
firm. We examine each of these constraints before characterizing the solution.
4.1 The hiding dynamic incentive-compatibility constraint
The firm of type θ does not hide its type by abating qτ (θ) instead of s1, if the following
hiding DIC constraint holds:
θC(qτ (θ))− τqτ (θ) + ρ[θC(q∗(θ))− τq∗(θ)] ≤ θC(s1)− τs1 + ρ[θC(s2)− τs2]. (12)
The discounted cost if the type is revealed on the left-hand side of (12) should not be
higher than if it is hidden on the right-hand side of (12). The firm has to balance the
current extra cost of abating s1 instead of its cost-minimization level q
τ (θ) (first two
terms on each side of the inequality), with the discounted future benefit of having a
laxer updated standard s2 instead of q
∗(θ) (terms in brackets on the two sides of the
inequality).
It turns out that the hiding DIC constraint is more stringent than the IC constraint
13See Freixas et al. (1985) for a formal characterization of the ratchet effect in mechanism design.
14Note that a firm would never mimic a lower type because it would imply abating more both
periods.
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in (5). Substituting s1 = q
τ (θ̃1) into (12) shows that this inequality does not hold
for θ = θ̃ as long as ρ > 0 for any future standard s2 less stringent than q
∗(θ̃). By
continuity, it does not hold either for types close to θ̃1. Hence, the standard s1 = q
τ (θ̃1)
does not satisfy the hiding DIC constraint for types close to θ̃1 as well as for higher
types.
Is it possible to satisfy the hiding DIC constraint for some types? To investigate
this question, let us denote by θ̇1 the type that binds (12) given s1 and s2, i.e.,
θ̇1C(q
τ (θ̇1))−τqτ (θ̇1)+ρ[θ̇1C(q∗(θ̇1))−τq∗(θ̇1)] = θ̇1C(s1)−τs1+ρ[θ̇1C(s2)−τs2]. (13)
Let us write the hiding DIC constraint (12) as follow:
θC(qτ (θ))−τqτ (θ)+ρ[θC(q∗(θ))−τq∗(θ)]− [θC(s1)−τs1]−ρ[θC(s2)−τs2] ≤ 0 (14)
Differentiating (14) with respect to θ and substituting τ = θC ′(qτ (θ)), we obtain:
C(qτ (θ))− C(s1)) *+ ,
(a)
+ρ [C(q∗(θ))− C(s2)]) *+ ,
(b)










B′′(q∗(θ))− θC ′′(q∗(θ)) (16)
is found by differentiating (2). Condition (15) decomposes the effects of a marginally
higher type θ on the hiding DIC constraint into three terms. It includes two direct costs:
(a) the current cost of hiding type by abating s1 instead of q
τ (θ), (b) the future benefit
from hiding type, which is being allowed to abate s2 units instead of the standard
updated at the first-best level q∗(θ). Both differences are strictly positive whenever s1
and s2 are such that q
τ (θ) > s1 and q
∗(θ) > s2, meaning that the direct effect increases
(14) with θ. The remaining term (c) is the indirect effect of a marginally higher type θ:
it implies a higher first-best abatement level q∗(θ) due to a more stringent regulation




Overall (15) is positive if the direct effect offsets the indirect effect. Let sr2 denote the
equilibrium second-period standard. The following assumption is a sufficient condition
for (15) to be positive.
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Assumption 1




for every θ ∈ [θ, θ] where q∗(θ), sr2 and
dq∗(θ)
dθ
are defined by (2), (21) and (16) respec-
tively.
To see under which conditions on the premise of the model Assumption 1 holds, let
us focus on the second term on write the right-hand side of the inequality, which can
be written as follows:





Assumption 1 holds when (17), which is negative, is small compared to C(q∗(θ)) −
C(qτ (θ). That is, (i) when C(q) is not “too convex” because then C ′(q∗(θ)) is close to
C ′(qτ (θ)) and C ′′(.) is low and positive so that the denominator is high, (ii) B′′(.) is
high, meaning that B is “very concave”, (i.e., the marginal damage from pollution is
increasing substantially with pollution concentration).
Under Assumption 1, the left-hand side of (14) is increasing with θ which implies
that it holds for θ ≤ θ̇1 but not for θ > θ̇1. Furthermore, it also implies θ̇1 < θ̃1.
Thus, under Assumption 1, the hiding DIC constraint holds for every type θ ≤ θ̇1.
Hence, given s1, the firm reveals its type by over-complying with an abatement effort
qτ (θ) > s1 when of type θ ≥ θ̇1. Otherwise, the firm abates at the standard level




hide its type by not over-complying with the standard even if over-compliance is in its
short-term interest. Hence, less types are revealed for the same standard.
4.2 The mimicking dynamic incentive-compatibility constraint
The firm of type θ < θ̇1 does not mimic another type θ
′ by abating qτ (θ′) > s1 if the
following mimicking DIC constraints holds for every θ < θ̇1:
θC(qτ (θ))−τqτ (θ)+ρ[θC(q∗(θ))−τq∗(θ)] ≤ θC(qτ (θ′))−τqτ (θ′)+ρ[θC(q∗(θ′))−τq∗(θ′)].
(18)
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The firm of type θ might be tempted to abate less than its cost-minimizing level
qτ (θ) because, due to the convexity of the cost function C(q), the present extra cost
θC(qτ (θ′))− τqτ (θ′)− [θC(qτ (θ))− τqτ (θ)] is more than offset by the future cost saved
θC(q∗(θ))−τq∗(θ)− [θC(q∗(θ′))−τq∗(θ′)]. Doing so, the firm of type θ mimics another
type θ′ which would also over-comply but less, i.e. with θ < θ′ < θ̇. Let us denote by
x the type that minimizes the right-hand side of (18) with respect to θ′ ∈ [θ, θ̇]:
x(θ) = arg min
θ′∈[θ,θ̇1]
{θC(qτ (θ′))− τqτ (θ′) + ρ[θC(q∗(θ′))− τq∗(θ′)]}. (19)
We now examine under which conditions the mimicking DIC constraint is binding.
First, if x(θ) = θ̇1 then the right-hand side of (18) is always strictly lower than the
right-hand side of (12). Hence the mimicking DIC constraint holds: the firm of type
θ is worse off if it mimics another type by over-complying less than its per-period cost
minimizing abatement effort qτ (θ). Second, if x(θ) < θ̇1 and x(θ) ∕= θ then x(θ) > θ
because mimicking a lower type increases the discounting cost so that the firm is better
off revealing its type θ. Hence the mimicking DIC constraint might be biding for type
θ when θ < x(θ) < θ̇1.
Let ρ̃(θ) denote the discount factor for which the mimicking DIC constraint (18) is
biding for type θ, where the ‘best mimicking strategy’ is x(θ) with θ < x(θ) < θ̇1:
ρ̃(θ) =
θC(qτ (x(θ)))− τqτ (x(θ))− [θC(qτ (θ))− τqτ (θ)]
θC(q∗(θ))− τq∗(θ)− [θC(q∗(x(θ)))− τq∗(x(θ))] .
If θC(q∗(θ))− τq∗(θ)− [θC(q∗(x(θ)))− τq∗(x(θ))] > 0, then ρ̃(θ) > 0. In this case, ρ̃(θ)
defines an upper bound on ρ for which the mimicking DIC constraint of type θ holds
for every θ < θ̃1. In contrast, if θC(q
∗(θ)) − τq∗(θ) − [θC(q∗(x(θ))) − τq∗(x(θ))] ≤ 0,
the mimicking strategy x(θ) does not pay off because the future cost saved is negative
or nil while the current cost is strictly positive. Hence, the mimicking DIC constraint
would not be binding for type θ. We thus make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 ρ ≤ ρ̃(θ) for every θ < θ̇1 whenever ρ̃(θ) > 0.
4.3 The equilibrium standards
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a PBE in which the regulation reveals types
below θ̇1 by making the firm over-complying to the standard if its type is θ < θ̇1.
The equilibrium strategies are described in Appendix B.1. In this section, we focus
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exclusively on this equilibrium. Similarly to the case of a myopic firm, the first-period
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(20)
and the second-period equilibrium standard sr2 is defined by the following first-order
condition:
B′(sr2) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ̇1]C ′(sr2). (21)
The first-period standard sr1 is characterized by the following first-order condition:
B′(sr1) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ̇1]C ′(sr1)
−
-
W (qτ (θ̇1), θ̇1) + ρW (q
∗(θ̇1), θ̇1)−
'











< 0 is derived in Appendix B.2. Likewise with a myopic firm, the welfare
gain from revealing the threshold type θ̇ is the third term in the right-hand side of
(22). It is positive because q∗(θ̇1) > q
τ (θ̇1) > s
r
1
15 and q∗(θ̇1) > s
r
2. Hence, as with a
myopic firm, the standard is relaxed to induce more of the firm’s types to over-comply.
Nevertheless, less information is revealed as the firm hides its type if θ ∈ [θ̇1, τC ′(s1)
].
Furthermore, since the second line in (22) is strictly positive, comparing (21) and (22)
shows that the standard is strengthened in the second period when the firm does not
over comply: sr2 > s
r
1.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the tax is used to reveal types even if the
firm anticipates future standard updates. However, for a given standard s1, less types
are revealed as a firm of type θ ∈ [θ̇1, τC ′(s1)
] prefers to hide its type by not abating
more than required by the standard even if its short-term interest is to do so.
Another similarity with the case of the myopic firm is that all information revelation
occurs during period 1 in the described PBE. The fact that the standard is strengthened
15To see this, recall that we have assumed qτ (θ) < q∗(θ) for every θ which implies the first inequality
for θ = θ̇1. Furthermore, θ̇1 < θ̃1 implies q
τ (θ̇1) > q
τ (θ̃1) which, combined with q
τ (θ̃1) = s
r
1 by
definition of θ̃1 in (7), leads to the second inequality.
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to sr2 > s
r
1 after the first period implies that if the firm did reveal its type by over-
complying in the first period, it continues do so in the future. A firm of any type θ > θ̇
would never abate qτ (θ) > sr2 at any period t > 1 because the current benefit of doing
so is lower than it was in period 1 while the future cost is the same. To be precise, the
firm saves θc(sr2)− τsr2 − [θC(qτ (θ)− τqτ (θ)] by revealing its type after period 1 which
is lower than what it would have saved θc(sr1)− τsr1 − [θC(qτ (θ)− τqτ (θ)] in period 1
because qτ (θ) > sr2 > s
r
1 and θC(q)− τq is convex with a minimum at qτ (θ). Hence, if
the firm has to hide its type at some point in time, it should do it in the first period.16




> 0 for every θ < θ̇1 such that ρ(θ) > 0.
Proposition 3 In the regulation game with a forward-looking strategic firm, a higher
tax makes information revelation more likely by increasing the maximal discount factor
ρ̃(θ) at which the mimicking DIC constraint hold for a given type θ whenever it is
binding.
In the regulation game, the ratchet effect precludes information revelation over time.
However, the regulator can still take advantage of the tax to induce over-compliance
and information revelation if the firm is of low-cost type. Moreover, compared to the
case without tax, the regulator relaxes the standard to induce more over-compliance
and, therefore, more types to be revealed. Proposition 3 states that a higher tax makes
this information revelation more likely because it relaxes the mimicking DIC constraint
(18). A higher tax makes mimicking other types less attractive and, therefore, (18)
holds for lower discount rates.
Note that more types can be revealed if the regulator can commit on how the
regulation would be updated contingently on the firm’s abatement. She would be
able to commit to set the standard at a distorted abatement level q(θ) < q∗(θ) if the
type is revealed by over-compliance. This would relax the hiding DIC constraint and,
therefore, increases the threshold θ̇1 for which it is binding. Hence more types θ ≤ θ̇1
would be revealed for a given s1. Similarly, distorting the standard when the type is
revealed can help to satisfy the mimicking DIC constraint so it would hold for higher
discount factors. Hence, the tax has stronger informational value if the regulator can
commit on future regulation updates.
In sum, our theoretical results imply that in a setting where a firm is regulated
by a standard and a tax, the revisions of the standard will be more stringent than if
16Put differently, the right-hand side of the hiding DIC constraint (12) is the lowest discounted cost
from hiding type across time.
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the firm was only regulated by the standard. Moreover, the magnitude of the revision
of the standard will be larger the larger is the over-compliance with the standard in
place. In the next section, we investigate if we observe such outcomes in the case of
NOx regulation in Sweden.
5 Empirical Analysis
For geological reasons, Sweden is particularly vulnerable to acidification, causing neg-
ative impacts on lake and forest ecosystems. Consequently, NOx emissions have been
an important environmental policy target. Combustion plants are subject to a heavy
NOx national tax and most (but not all) are also subject to individual NOx emissions
standards issued case-by-case, either by one of the 21 regional County Administrative
Boards, or by one of the five Environmental Courts that cover a geographical area of
several counties.17
NOx emissions standards were introduced in the 1980s. Standard are boiler-specific
so that similar firms might end up with different standards assigned to their boilers
within the same juridiction. There is no legal limit for how long a standard is valid,
though the common practice seems to be that standards are revised no latter than
every tenth year. The standards are specified in the plants’ operating licenses, and
firms must apply for operating licenses when they start operations and when they make
large changes to the operations (e.g. installing a new boiler or retrofitting a boiler to
use a different type of fuel). In the application, firms are required to submit information
about the operations and can propose emission standards based on evidence. However,
each County Administrative Board considers whether the suggested emission standards
are reasonable.18 If a firm violates the standard, it risks criminal charges and could
face fines to be determined in court.
Regarding the Swedish tax on NOx emissions, at the time it was introduced in
1992, close to 25% of the Swedish NOx emissions came from stationary combustion
plants. The installation of measuring equipment was judged too costly for smaller
17After the first of June 2012, only 12 County Administrative Boards, instead of 21, are responsible
for issuing the operating licenses.
18Important legislative frameworks that the County Administrative Boards must consider in the de-
termination of NOx emission standards are some EU directives and the Swedish Environmental Code.
If motivated, the regional decision maker can impose more stringent standards than the minimum
requirements specified in these directives. These should be determined in line with the Environmental
Code which, for example, states that regulations should be based on what is environmentally desirable,
technically possible and economically reasonable.
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plants and the charge therefore was only imposed on larger boilers. In order not to
distort competition between larger plants and smaller units not subjected to the tax,
a scheme was designed to refund the tax revenues back to the regulated plants in
proportion to energy output. Energy is measured in terms of so-called useful energy,
which can be in the form of electricity or heat depending on end-use. Regulated
entities belong to the heat and power sector, the pulp and paper industry, the waste
incineration sector and the chemical, wood, food and metal industries. Initially the tax
only covered boilers and gas turbines with a yearly production of useful energy of at
least 50 GWh, but in 1996 the threshold was lowered to 40 GWh and in 1997 further
lowered to 25 GWh per year. From 1992 to 2007, the tax was 40 SEK/kg NOx. In
2008, the charge was raised to 50 SEK/kg NOx. In real terms, the increase to 50 SEK
in 2008 was only a restoration of the charge to the real level in 1992.
In this section, we take advantage of the overlap between the locally decided emis-
sion standards and the national NOx tax to investigate two theoretical predictions of
our model: (i) boilers that are taxed experience more updating of their standards (more
frequent and greater magnitude) compared to boilers that are not, (ii) the standards
for the taxed boilers become more stringent for over-complying boilers compared to
boilers that emit no more than the standard.
In order to test our predictions, we collected information about boiler specific stan-
dards for the period 1980-2012 from county authorities and about boilers subject to
the tax system from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency’s NOx database.
Using such information, we compare the stringency of the standards of taxed and un-
taxed boilers and investigate the determinants of the magnitude of the revision of the
standards for taxed boilers.
Preliminary evidence suggests that taxed and untaxed boilers are regulated differ-
ently by local authorities. Figure 2 graphs the evolution of the average standard of
the boilers already in operations when the tax was implemented over the period 1985-
2012. The average standards of the two type of boilers, those that were taxed at some
point in time and those that were exempted, follow a similar trend of reduction of the
emission standard over time prior to the introduction of the NOx tax in 1992, 1996
or 1997, depending on the boiler’s annual energy use. The two lines diverge just after
the tax was introduced, as the standards of taxed boilers become more stringent on
average.19
19Standards often depend on the date of entry, with later entrants facing more stringent regula-
tion (i.e., vintage-differentiated regulation). Figure 2 only plots the standards of boilers already in
operations by 1992 to factor out the vintage effect.
22
Figure 2: Average Standard by Year
Notes: The figure is based on the revisions of 328 boilers that were already operating when the tax
was implemented. The two lines display the yearly average emission standard (mg/MJ) for untaxed
and taxed over the period 1985 and 2012. The vertical lines show the years when the tax was first
implemented (1992) and when the capacity threshold to be subject to the tax was modified (1996 and
1997).
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Figure 3: Variations in standard stringency of taxed boilers
Notes: The bars present the distribution of the magnitude of the revisions of the standards of 516
taxed boilers for the revisions that took place before and after the boiler became subject to the tax.
We also examine how standards are revised before and after the tax has been
introduced. For a given boiler, we compute the magnitude of the revision ∆Standard
as the difference between the standard that applies to the boiler before and after the
revision. The revision strengthens the standard when ∆Standard > 0, while it relaxes
it when ∆Standard < 0. In Figure 3, we plot the distribution of the magnitude of
the standard revisions for the taxed boilers, separating between those revisions that
took place before and after the boilers were taxed. The figure suggests a different
distribution before and after the introduction of the tax. A two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test allows us to reject the null hypothesis of equality of the distributions. It
seems that there is a greater spread in the magnitude of the revision in absolute values
when the boilers are taxed, with a higher share of extreme values on both the positive
and negative sides. This evidence is consistent with the idea that the information
provided by the tax system is used by the local regulators to better tailor the standard.
When updating standards, the regulator might take into account whether the boiler
over-complies with current standards, and by how much; this would explain the large
variation of the update of stringency of standards for taxed boilers.
In what follows we investigate the impact of the NOx tax on emission standard
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updates and the determinants of the magnitude of the update of the standards for
taxed boilers.
5.1 Impact of the NOx tax on emission standard updates
We collected information about 741 boilers subject to emission standards expressed in
(mg/MJ). Out of these boilers, 516 boilers have been subject to both the tax and the
standards and 225 only subject to the standards. Since standards are revised unevenly
across time, we use two statistics to measure the standard update: the frequency and
the magnitude of the revisions. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the revisions
of stringency of the boilers in our sample20 On average, there is a statistically larger
fraction of revisions for taxed boilers than for untaxed boilers (e.g., 60% vs 41%).
Moreover, the magnitude of the revision ∆ Standard is statistically larger for taxed
boilers. Furthermore, the number of years between revisions is statistically lower for
taxed boilers.
Untaxed Taxed p-value
# Boilers 223 516 —
# Standards 324 901 —
Standards revised (%) 41 60 < 0.001
∆ Standard (mg/MJ) 23.63 38.87 < 0.001
Years between revisions 6.7 6.02 < 0.001
Table 1: Statistics on standards update
We first evaluate the effect of the NOx tax on the probability of standard revision
and on the magnitude of the revision. The outcomes variables correspond to Pijt and
∆Standardijt, where Pijt takes a value equal to one if the standard that applied to
boiler i located at county j was revised at time t, and zero otherwise. As described
before, ∆Standardijt corresponds to the difference between the standard that applies
to boiler i (located at county j) at time t− 1 and the standard that applies to boiler i
at time t.
The outcome variables Pijt and ∆ Standardijt are regressed as a function of the
NOx tax regulation, measured by the dummy variable Taxijt−1 that takes a value equal
20We excluded two boilers from the analysis because their emission standards differed significantly
from other observations (i.e., outliers). Thus, our analysis is based on 516 boilers subject to both
regulations and 223 boilers subject only to emission standards.
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to one if boiler i located at county j is subject to the NOx tax at time t− 1 and zero
otherwise. We should expect the probability of standard revision and the stringency
of the revision to depend on the length of time that has elapsed since the previous
revision. We proxy for this by the log of the number of years that have elapsed since
the boiler was regulated by the last time, denoted as ∆ log Yearsijt. For boilers whose
standard has never been revised, the variable corresponds to the log of the number
of years that have elapsed since the boiler was assigned the first standard. For those
boilers whose standard has been revised, the variable corresponds to the log of the
number of years that have elapsed between standard revisions. We use a logarithmic
transformation because the number of years that have elapsed since the boiler was last
regulated is a highly skewed variable.
Additional controls include a vector Z of L boiler and firm characteristics (for
instance, industrial sector and boiler size). Moreover ζj are county fixed effects that
account for non-observable characteristics of the county that can affect the stringency
of the standards, ηt are yearly fixed effects to account for any variation in the outcome
that occurs over time and that is not attributed to the other explanatory variables,
and εijt is the error term.
Pijt = α + βTaxijt−1 + γ∆ log Yearsijt+
L/
l=1
κlZil + ζj + ηt + εijt,(23)
∆Standardijt = α + βTaxijt−1 + δ∆ log Yearsijt+
L/
l=1
κlZil + ζj + ηt + εijt,(24)
We estimate equations (23) and (24) with robust standard errors clustered at the
boiler level to account for the potential correlation of the standards of a given boiler
over time.21
The data is an unbalanced pooled cross-section over time panel of boilers, where
boilers are observed every year from the year when they are assigned the first standard.
In our sample, each boiler has received (on average) 1.92 standards, and 427 out of
739 boilers have been assigned only one standard during the whole sampled period.
Those boilers that have received more than one standard have received (on average)
2.7 standards, and the average number of years between revisions is 6.1 years.
Regarding the sources of data, information about standards over the period 1980-
21Errors are clustered at the boiler level since standards are boiler-specific. By clustering at the
boiler level, we control for the potential correlation in the setting of the standards due to the correlation
of costs of emissions reductions across periods. Our results are, however, robust to more aggregate
clusters, as for instance, clustering at the county level.
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2012 specified in the operating licenses of combustion plants was obtained from county
authorities. Information on NOx emissions over the period 1992-2012 comes from the
Swedish NOx database, which is a panel covering all boilers monitored under the tax
system. The NOx database also includes information on boiler capacity, industrial
sector, and the availability of NOx reducing technologies.
See Table 2 for a description of the variables.
Variable Description N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Standard mg NOx/MJ 11477 110.77 50.22 21.90 300
Tax 1 if subject to NOx tax; 0 otherwise 11477 0.70 0.45 0 1
# Standards # of Standards 11477 1.92 1.09 1 7
Standard Revised (%) 11477 0.54 0.50 0 1
∆Standard Current − Previous standard 3757 35.68 60.21 -160 230
log∆Years log of # years last regulated 10585 1.65 0.84 0 3.33
Boiler/Firm Characteristics
Waste 1 if waste; 0 otherwise 11477 0.11 0.31 0 1
Food 1 if food; 0 otherwise 11477 0.07 0.25 0 1
Heat and Power 1 if heat and power; 0 otherwise 11477 0.68 0.47 0 1
Pulp and Paper 1 if pulp and paper ; 0 otherwise 11477 0.06 0.24 0 1
Metal 1 if metal; 0 otherwise 11477 0.015 0.12 0 1
Chemicals 1 if chemicals; 0 otherwise 11477 0.025 0.16 0 1
Wood 1 if wood ; 0 otherwise 11477 0.04 0.20 0 1
Boiler Size Installed boiler effect in MW 10895 55.14 94.51 1.3 825
Over-compliance 1 if over-complies more than mean; 4617 0.51 0.49 0 1
0 otherwise
NOx technology 1 if technology is intalled; 0 otherwise 11477 0.55 0.59 0 1
Notes: Data about standards was obtained from county authorities. Data on emissions, boiler
capacity, industrial sector and availability of abatement technologies was obtained from the Swedish
Protection Agency.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
From Table 2, we observe that 70% of the boilers have been taxed at some point
in time, and that the majority of the boilers in the data set belong to the heat and
power sector. Moreover, there is large variation among standards both in stringency
and frequency of revision. Such variation reflects differences in boiler size, technology
availability, and industrial sector, among others.
Table 3 presents the results of the regression model specified in equations (23) and
(24). The first three columns report the coefficients estimated in the equation on the
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probability of standard revision under different specifications. In col (1) we control for
sectorial fixed effects. In col (2) we control also for county fixed effects, while in col (3)
we control for sectorial, county and yearly fixed effects. The last five columns describe
the results for the equation on the stringency of the revision. cols (4)-(8) present the
results of the regression model specified in equation (24), where - again- in col (4) we
only control for sectorial fixed effects, in col (5) we control for sectorial and county
fixed effects, and in col (6) we control for sectorial, county and yearly fixed effects.
Furthermore, cols (7)-(8) investigate the effects of the NOx tax on the subsample of
first standards’ revision and on the subsample of boilers that were in place at the time
the tax was first implemented, respectively.
In cols (1)-(3), a negative sign of the coefficient indicates that the determinant
reduces the probability of standard revision. We observe that taxed boilers have indeed
a statistically significant higher probability of being revised. In the specifications in
cols (1) and (2), being taxed increases the probability of standard revision by about
20%. In specification (3), the effect is even larger as the probability of revisions for
taxed boilers is about 30% higher than that of untaxed boilers.
The time that has elapsed since the boiler was last regulated also increases the
probability of revisions in all specifications. Interestingly, the results in cols (1) and
(2) show that the standards of larger boilers are also more likely to be revised.
Regarding cols (4)-(6), the results do not support the hypothesis that the stringency
of the standard revisions is larger for boilers that are taxed. The results show, however,
that the longer the time that elapses between standard revisions, the greater is the
magnitude of the revision. Moreover, in cols (4) and (5) the magnitude of the revisions
seem to be larger for larger boilers.
It is possible that any information provided by the tax might have been of use
mostly the first time the standards were revised. The results in col (7) suggest so as
the positive and statistically significant tax coefficient indicates that the standards of
taxed boilers are more stringently revised than untaxed boilers. On average, the first
revision of taxed boilers was 14 mg/MJ more stringent than that of untaxed boilers
(i.e., about 40% more stringent).
In col (8), we examined whether the effects of the tax were more salient on the
subsample of boilers in operations at the time the tax was first implemented (i.e.,
boilers in operation already in 1992). The results, however, indicate no effect of the
tax on the magnitude of the revision for this subsample.
Thus, we can conclude that the results provide empirical support to our hypothesis
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that the standards of taxed boilers are revised more often, and that the tax might have
played a role increasing the stringency of the revisions the first time the standards
were revised. The stringency of the revisions, is however, not affected by the tax when
analyzing the whole sample of revisions. How can these findings be reconciled? A
potential explanation is the existence of spillover effects between taxed and untaxed
boilers that took place over time. After increasing the stringency of standards for
taxed boilers, the regulator might require boilers that are not taxed to implement
similar technologies and management practices for reducing pollution. This argument
is consistent with the trends observed in Figure 2, where both taxed and untaxed boilers
have reduced their emissions significantly over time. The fact that the standards of
taxed boilers are revised more often should also increase the overall stringency of the
standards over time, since more frequent increases in the standard stringency for taxed
boilers should lead to greater increases in the standard stringency for untaxed boilers
when these are revised.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pijt ∆Standardijt
NOx Taxt−1 0.194 0.187 0.286 3.495 -2.104 -0.522 14.217 1.538
(0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (5.433) (4.868) (5.275) (6.574) (6.631)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.521] [0.666] [0.921] [0.031] [0.817]
Log ∆Yearst 0.175 0.195 0.279 4.878 3.783 8.577 7.893 7.838
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (1.804) (1.695) (2.715) (2.939) (3.364)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.007] [0.026] [0.002] [0.008] [0.021]
Sizeijt 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.062 0.063 0.051 0.044 0.036
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.034)
[0.001] [0.023] [0.262] [0.086] [0.045] [0.102] [0.247] [0.289]
FE Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE County NO YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
FE Year NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES
#Obs 9981 9981 9732 3490 3490 3490 2220 2626
#Boilers 681 673 673 301 301 301 280 191
Pseudo R2/R2 0.023 0.037 0.068 0.041 0.214 0.240 0.336 0.256
Notes: Cols (1)-(3) of this table present estimates of equation (24). The dependent variable is a
binary variable that takes a value equal to one if the standard that applied to boiler i located at
county j was revised at time t, and zero otherwise. Cols (4)-(8) of this table present estimates of
equation (25). The depend variable corresponds to the difference between the standard that applies
to boiler i (located at county j) at time t-1 and the standard that applies to boiler i at time t.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by boiler. p-values in brackets.
Table 3: Probability and Stringency of Emission Standard Updates
It is worth to mention that, in contrast to our theoretical analysis, the Swedish
standard on NOx is relative to useful energy (i.e., expressed in mg /MJ). It is therefore
a relative rather than an absolute standard. It is well known that relative standards
might incentivize firms to increase output to comply with the standards via the so-
called dilution effect; see e.g. Phaneuf and Requate (2017, Chapter 5). Nevertheless,
we believe that this dilution effect is at least minor as it might play a role only for the
heat and power sector because energy is an input for all other sectors and reducing its
use is one of the abatement strategies. Furthermore, if it does, this specificity of the
heat of power sector is to somehow controlled by means of fixed effects.
Finally, there might be other potential reasons why local regulators would revise
the stringency of the standards to different extents (see Segerson 2020 and Shobe 2020
for recent overviews of the literature on environmental federalism). For example, a
local regulator might seek to impose regulations that are more stringent than those set
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at the national level when it feels national regulations are not sufficient for that county.
In such case, the national regulation acts as minimum, with counties having the option
to go beyond those minimums. Moreover, regulators might update the stringency of
the standards in response to technological progress. Our empirical analysis attempts to
account for such effects through county fixed effects and yearly fixed effects that should
capture heterogeneity across counties and trends on increased standards stringency over
time, respectively.
5.2 How taxed boilers standards are updated
To address our second research question, we regress our dependent variables, Pijt and
∆Standardijt, only for the sample of taxed boilers.
22 The dependent variables are
explained as a function of the lagged value of a proxy for ”over-compliance” with the
standard, measured as the difference between the emissions’ concentration specified
by the standard and the actual emissions (i.e., Standardijt − Eijt) and as a function
of the availability of NOx reducing technologies at year t − 1. Our dummy variable
over-compliance takes a value equal to one if boiler i over-complies at a level greater
than the median over-compliance of all boilers at year t − 1. It takes a value equal
to zero otherwise. Regarding technologies, there is a large scope for NOx reduction
through various technical measures. For example, it is possible to reduce NOx emis-
sions through investment in post-combustion technologies that clean up NOx once it
has been formed, or through combustion technologies involving the optimal control
of combustion parameters to inhibit the formation of thermal and prompt NOx. Be-
cause the adoption of these technologies allows further reductions of NOx emissions,
we expect that their availability increases the probability and stringency of standard
revisions. To account for the effect of the availability of NOx abatement technologies,
we include a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if the boiler had installed
NOx abatement technologies at year time t− 1, and zero otherwise.
See Table 2 for summary statistics for the over-compliance dummy, and the avail-
ability of NOx reducing technology.
As before, we control for boiler’s and firm’s characteristics, and sectorial, county
and yearly fixed effects. Moreover, we estimate the regressions with robust standard
errors clustered at the boiler level. Results are summarized in Table 4 below.
22Another reason for restricting the sample to taxed boilers is that we only have information about
NOx emissions if the boiler is taxed, as the untaxed boilers are not required to report their NOx
emissions to the regulator.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pijt ∆Standardijt
Over-complianceijt−1 0.334 7.916 16.663
(0.072) (5.617) (6.928)
[<0.001] [0.160] [0.017]
Technologyijt−1 0.166 -8.661 -15.313
(0.070) (6.973) (8.468)
[0.018] [0.215] [0.072]
Log ∆Yearst 0.230 0.305 8.969 10.769 7.372 10.575
(0.056) (0.004) (3.549) (2.918) (4.272) (3.407)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [0.012] [<0.001] [0.086] [0.002]
Sizeijt 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.054 -0.001 0.047
(0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035)
[0.778] [0.624] [0.712] [0.087] [0.986] [0.183]
FE Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE County YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
#Obs 4178 6715 1954 2728 1549 2155
#Boilers 471 499 220 238 151 161
Pseudo R2/R2 0.081 0.072 0.245 0.275 0.263 0.286
Notes: Cols (1)-(2) of this table present estimates of the effects of over-compliance and availability of
technology on the probability of standard revisions of taxed boilers. The dependent variable is a
binary variable that takes a value equal to one if the standard that applied to a taxed boiler i
located at county j was revised at time t, and zero otherwise.
Cols (3)-(6) of this table present estimates of the effects of over-compliance and availability of
technology on the magnitude of standards revisions of taxed boilers. The depend variables
corresponds to the difference between the standard that applies to taxed boiler i (located at county
j) at time t-1 and the standard that applies to taxed boiler i at time t.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by boiler. p-values in brackets.
Table 4: Probability and Stringency of Revisions on Taxed Boilers
Cols (1)-(2) present the results for the probability of standard revision. In col (1)
we observe that belonging to the group of boilers that over-complies with standards
more than the median increases the probability of standard revision. Likewise, in col
(2) we observe that having adopted NOx reducing technologies the previous year also
increases the probability of revision. As before, the number of years that have elapsed
since the boiler was last regulated is an important determinant of the probability of
revision.
Cols (3)-(6) present the results for the stringency of the revisions. Cols (3)-(4)
32
present the results for the whole sample of revisions of taxed boilers. Cols (5)-(6)
present the results for the sub-sample of boilers in operations at the time the tax was
first implement to investigate if the effects of over-compliance and the availability of
NOx reducing technologies are more salient for the boilers that first became subject to
the policy overlap.
The results in cols (3)-(4) show that stringency is not statistically affected by the
extent of over-compliance, nor by the availability of NOx reducing technologies, but it
is significantly affected by the number of years that have elapsed between revisions.
The results in cols (5)-(6) show that over-compliance by the boilers in place at the
time the tax was first implement led to more stringent revisions (almost 24% more
stringent given an average standard equal to 68 mg/MJ for taxed boilers in 1992).
In constrast, the availability NOx reducing technologies by these boilers seemed to
have led to less stringent standard revisions. A potential explanation to this is that
local regulators might have sought to easen the regulatory burden of those boilers to
reward their investments and spur the adoption of NOx reducing technologies. However,
such finding should be interpreted with caution since the statistical significant of the
coefficient is small.
In sum, we obtain no clear empirical pattern on how standards of taxed boilers are
updated depending on over-compliance and technology when we analyze the whole sam-
ple of revisions of taxed boilers. We do find some evidence that support our hypothesis
that the standards of taxed boilers become more stringent when boilers over-comply
with the standards when we analyze the revisions of the boilers that first became
subject to the policy overlap.
6 Conclusion
Most major environmental problems are addressed by a series of policy instruments
enacted at all levels of government, implying that regulations covering the same emis-
sion sources overlap and override each other. This paper investigates the informational
value of the policy overlap. When one of the instruments in the mix is a market-based
instrument incentivizing firms to abate pollution to the cost-minimizing level, infor-
mation about the firms’ abatement costs is revealed and can be used to improve the
design of other regulations implemented by the same or different regulatory authori-
ties. Concretely, observing the abatement induced by the market-based instrument, a
regulator can conclude that the cost of reducing emissions is lower than expected and
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can respond by strengthening the standard in the future, to better balance benefits
with costs. We characterize the value of such information. To take advantage of the
information revealed by the tax, the regulator can also relax the standard to obtain a
more precise distribution of abatement costs. Although the standard is updated based
on the firm’s abatement strategy, it always strengthened after the learning phase, re-
gardless of whether the firm over-complies with the standards. A firm anticipating
the future standard update might hide its abatement cost by distorting its abatement
effort. This induces a ratchet effect which undermines information revelation. Never-
theless, the tax can still be used to reveal information about abatement costs when the
costs are high enough.
Our analysis of the case of the regulation of NOx emissions by stationary pollution
sources in Sweden provides support to our theoretical predictions. We observe that the
standards of taxed boilers are revised more often and that the information provided by
the tax seems to have affected the stringency of the first revisions taking place after the
tax was implemented. Since regulators often implement similar standards for similar
pollution sources, one can expect that over time the increased stringency spills over to
untaxed boilers.
Our paper focuses on the case of the overlap between emission taxes and emission
standards. However, the rationale for the informational value of the policy overlap
could be easily generalized to the case of other environmental policy mixes where a
market-based instrument is used (e.g, interaction of tradable emission permits (TEPs)
with other instruments, because TEPs reveal the same type of information about abate-
ment costs as taxes). It could also be generalized to other regulatory policy overlaps.
An example is the regulation of public utilities, where the regulator often encounters
asymmetric information about the cost of production, and the regulation of prices is
usually complemented with the regulation of the quality of the products or of pollution,
as in Baron (1985). If the costs of improved quality are revealed when the firms make
their production decisions, the regulator might be able to infer relevant information
about the firms’ costs that can be used to better design the quality standards.
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A Details and proofs in the regulation game with
myopic firm
A.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a myopic firm
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the regulation game with a myopic firm is
a set of strategies s1, st(ht) for every t > 1, q1(s1, θ), qt(st, ht, θ) for every t > 1 and
every θ ∈ [θ, θ], where ht is the history of past strategies played, and beliefs f(θ) and
µt(θ|ht) for θ ∈ [θ, θ] for every t > 1 such that:
• q1(s1, θ) minimizes the firm’s cost in period 1.
• qt(st, ht, θ) minimizes the firm’s cost in period t.
• s1 maximizes the expected welfare given the beliefs f(θ).
• st(ht) maximizes the expected welfare given the beliefs µ(θ|ht).
• µt(θ|ht) are updated using Bayes’ rule when possible.
Assuming (out-of-equilibrium) passive beliefs, the separating solution is supported by
the following strategies and beliefs:
q1(s1, θ) = max{s1, qτ (θ)} for every θ ∈ [θ, θ],








q∗(θ) if q1 = q
τ (θ) > sd1









q∗(θ) if qt−1 = q
τ (θ) > sd2










1 if q1 = q
τ (θ) > sd1






1 if qt−1 = q
τ (θ) > sd2
f(θ|θ ≥ θ̃1) if qt−1 = sd2
f(θ) otherwise
for t > 2, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] with θ̃1 = τC ′(s1)
.
A.2 Proof that θ̃2 = θ̃1 in the PBE
Let us denote by V (θ̃t, θ) the expected welfare of the regulation game when the firm’s
type is θ and the regulator’s believes on the distribution of types are F (θ|θ ≥ θ̃t) on
the range [θ̃t, θ].
Suppose the reverse: θ̃2 ∕= θ̃1. First, we cannot have θ̃2 < θ̃1 because q2(θ) = qτ (θ) for
all θ ∈ [θ̃2, θ̃1] and, therefore, the optimal standard is s2(q1) = q∗(θ) for all those types
θ, not sd2.




1 by definition of θ̃t = τ/C
′(sdt ) for
t = 1, 2. Furthermore, if the standard has been revised to sd2 rather than remained
unchanged to sd1, it should be that the expected discounted welfare is higher with s
d
2
than with sd1 starting from period 2, that is:
# θ̃2
θ̃1
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ̃1) +
# θ̄
θ̃2




W (q∗(θ), θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ̃1) +
# θ̄
θ̃2





W (sd1, θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ̃1) + β
# θ
θ̃1
V (θ̃1, θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ̃1).
(25)
We show, that if (25) holds, the discounted expected welfare in period 1 is strictly
higher with sd2 rather than with s
d





[W (qτ (θ), θ) + βW (q∗(θ), θ)] dF (θ)+
# θ
θ̃2
W (sd2, θ)dF (θ)+β
# θ
θ̃2
V (θ̃2, θ)dF (θ). (26)
Since θ̃2 > θ̃1, (26) can be written as:
# θ̃1
θ
[W (qτ (θ), θ) + βW (q∗(θ), θ)] dF (θ) +
# θ̃2
θ̃1




W (sd2, θ)dF (θ) + β
# θ
θ̃2
V (θ̃2, θ)dF (θ).
(27)
Using (25) multiplied by 1− F (θ̃1), we obtain that (27) is strictly higher than:
# θ̃1
θ
[W (qτ (θ), θ) + βW (q∗(θ), θ)] dF (θ)+
# θ
θ̃1
W (sd1, θ)dF (θ)+β
# θ
θ̃1
V (θ̃1, θ)dF (θ), (28)
which is the discounted expected welfare with the standard sd1 during period 1. We
conclude that (26) is strictly higher than (28): the discounted expected welfare is higher
if sd2 rather than s
d
1 is implemented during the first stage of the regulation game, which
contradicts that sd1 is the optimal standard in period 1.
B Details and proofs in the regulation game with
a forward-looking firm
B.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a forward-looking firm
The hiding DIC constraint for periods t > 1 is:
θC(qτ (θ))− τqτ (θ) + ρ[θC(q∗(θ))− τq∗(θ)] ≤ (1 + ρ)[θC(s2)− τs2]. (29)
Let us define the following inequalities which compare the right-hand sides of the hiding
and mimicking DIC constraints in period 1 and t > 1 respectively:
θC(s1)− τs1+ρ[θC(s2)− τs2] ≤ θC(qτ (θ′))− τqτ (θ′)+ρ[θC(q∗(θ′))− τq∗(θ′)] (30)
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(1 + ρ)[θC(s2)− τs2] ≤ θC(qτ (θ′))− τqτ (θ′) + ρ[θC(q∗(θ′))− τq∗(θ′)] (31)
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the regulation game with a forward-
looking firm is a set of strategies s1, st(ht) for every t > 1, q1(s1, θ), qt(st, ht, θ) for
every t > 1 and every θ ∈ [θ, θ], where ht is the history of past strategies played, and
beliefs f(θ) and µt(θ|ht) for θ ∈ [θ, θ] for every t > 1 such that:
• q1(s1, θ) minimizes the firm’s discounted cost in period 1.
• qt(st, ht, θ) minimizes the firm’s discounted cost in period t.
• s1 maximizes the discounted expected welfare given the beliefs f(θ) in period 1.
• st(ht) maximizes the expected welfare given the beliefs µ(θ|ht) in period t.
• µt(θ|ht) are updated using Bayes’ rule when possible.
Assuming (out-of-equilibrium) passive beliefs, the separating solution is supported by





qτ (θ) if (12) and (18) hold for every θ′ such that qτ (θ′) > s1
s1 if (12) does not hold and (30) holds for every θ
′ such that qτ (θ′) > s1,
qτ (x(θ)) otherwise,




qτ (θ) if (29) and (18) hold for every θ′ such that qτ (θ′) > s2
s2 if (29) does not hold and (31) holds for every θ
′ such that qτ (θ′) > s2,
qτ (x(θ)) otherwise,








q∗(θ) if q1 = q
τ (θ) > sr1









q∗(θ) if qt−1 = q
τ (θ) > sr2










1 if q1 = q
τ (θ) > sr1






1 if qt−1 = q
τ (θ) > sr2
f(θ|θ ≥ θ̇1) if qt−1 = sr2
f(θ) otherwise
for t > 2, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] with θ̇1 defined in (16) with s1 = sr1 and s2 = sr2.
B.2 Variation of θ̇1 with s1













C ′(q∗(θ̇1))− C ′(qτ (θ̇1))
( dq∗(θ̇1)
dθ̇1
The denominator is positive by Assumption 1. We show that the numerator is negative
by contradiction. Suppose θ̇1C
′(sr1) ≥ τ . Since τ = θ̇1C ′(qτ (θ̇1)) by definition of qτ (θ)
for every θ, θ̇1C
′(sr1) ≥ θ̇1C ′(qτ (θ̇1)), which implies sr1 ≥ qτ (θ̇1). If sr1 = qτ (θ̇1), (13) does
not hold. As long as θ is sufficiently low, e.g. close to zero, ∃θ′ such that sr1 = qτ (θ′)
and, therefore, the hiding DIC constraint (12) is violated for θ′. Hence, the standard
sr1 is not hiding dynamic incentive-compatible, a contradiction.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let N(θ) ≡ θC(qτ (x(θ)))− τqτ (x(θ))− [θC(qτ (θ))− τqτ (θ)] denote the numerator and




= qτ (θ)− qτ (x(θ)) > 0 and dD(θ)
dτ
= q∗(x(θ))− q∗(θ) < 0. Therefore,
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